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1 Introduction
In his path-breaking work, Spence (1973, 1974) suggested that diﬃculties in observing those
attributes of jobseekers which correlated with labor productivity would result in an equilib-
rium where the wage oﬀers were based on the observable educational levels; i.e. employers
would use educational signals as a sorting device. However, the viability of such a sig-
nalling (=separating) equilibrium remained unclear in Spences analysis. The necessary
preconditions for the existence of a separating regime would be that workers with greater
productivity also face smaller marginal cost in acquiring education and that the equilibrium
wage function (contingent upon the signals) would induce the workers of each type to
choose diﬀerent educational levels.
As a natural starting point, it was Þrst examined whether such a wage function could
arise as an extension of the Walrasian price vector. It was shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) (in the context of a two class model) and Riley (1975) (with continuum of types) that
separating regime1 generally fails to reach stability in Walrasian competitive equilibrium
context2 . In the current model, the problems related to Walrasian equilibrium are avoided
by utilizing a search-theoretic approach with decentralized trading. Assuming pairwise
matching, each market participant have access to at most one trading opportunity at a time
and wages are determined under a strategic bargaining process between an unemployed
worker and a Þrm. Our focus is on wage functions that support separating equilibrium so
that the educational signals fully reveals workers types, and there is no need for additional
signalling for example through unexpected wage demands3.
Our analysis is not explicitly game-theoretic4 but rather close to Rileys (1979) com-
petitive equilibrium model - the key diﬀerence being decentralized trading process postulated
in the current setting. Indeed, our model reproduces the so called Riley outcome as a lim-
iting case. According to Riley outcome, the Pareto-dominant signalling proÞle is such that
the least able type chooses his Þrst-best educational level while the more able workers over-
invest in schooling in order to separate themselves from the less able colleagues. However,
1Or informational consistency in Rileys (1979) terminology.
2As a reÞnement of the conventional Walrasian equilibrium, Riley (1979) introduced restrictions to the
competitive behavior of agents. Rileys reactive equilibriumobtained stability.
3Generally, strategic bargaining models with asymmetric information can easily lead to a great multi-
plicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. This is because, the less informed party may have reasons to believe
that informed agents try to transmit information about their types, not only with the observable signal, but
also by making unexpected oﬀers. See for example Muthoo (1999, ch. 9.8) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
ch. 10.4).
4Perfect Bayeasian equilibrium and its reÞnements - perfect equilibrium á la Selten (1975), sequential
equilibrium by Kreps and Wilson (1982) as well as further reÞnements of sequential equilibrium introduced
by Cho and Kreps (1987) and by Banks and Sobel (1987) - oﬀer powerful tools for analyzing Spences idea
in game theoretic settings.
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given that education enhances productivity per se5, we Þnd that the overinvestment result
ceases to hold generally if both parties gain a positive fraction of the surplus generated
by the match. We show that the bargaining wage induces underinvestment in education
at least within a subset of types. Search frictions on workers side of the market tend
to amplify underinvestment. Moreover, the minimum signalling proÞle is not necessarily
Pareto-dominant. In our case, Pareto-dominant signalling proÞle entails underinvestment
in education among the most (least) able types if workers bargaining power is relatively
low (high).
The possibility of underinvestment in education under asymmetric information has
been previously studied at least by Stiglitz (1975), who pointed out that social return on
schooling may in some cases exceed private return, if the signalling somehow improves the
match between workers and jobs6. Stiglitz argument implicitly assumes heterogeneity in
both sides of the labor market - a feature that is not incorporated in the current model,
where the bilateral trading and search frictions suﬃce to give rise to ineﬃciently low levels
of schooling.
A steady state general equilibrium will be derived according to the matching frame-
work postulated by Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995), whose model, in turn, rests on the
pioneering works of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984, 2000). Our
key Þnding is that, if workers innate type and education are suﬃciently strong comple-
ments in terms of productivity, and/or if workers bargaining power is suﬃciently weak,
the underinvestment problem may hinder job creation when the labor market is slack.
Therefore, improvements in workers position - either through less severe search frictions or
increased bargaining power - reduce underinvestment in schooling and may actually stim-
ulate market entry by Þrms under certain parameter values. Due to this feature, multiple
steady state equilibria may arise. Reminiscent of the result derived by Laing et al. (1995)
in a pure human capital context, our model suggests that small improvements in either
market infrastructures or common technological knowledge may lead to a considerable leap
from a sub-optimal equilibrium among multiple steady states to a unique and more eﬃcient
steady state.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we Þrst characterize the pairwise
5Naturally, underinvestment in education may occur only if one assumes that education per se has a
positive eﬀect on labor productivity. A considerable empirical literature provides rather conßicting views on
this issue (traditional human capital theory initiated by Becker, 1964 in one hand and evidence from so called
sorting models (e.g., Kang and Bishop, 1986 and Altonji, 1995) on the other). However, Chatterji, Seaman
and Singell (2003) Þnd quite strong evidence that workers invest in education both because it improves their
productivity and because it distinguishes them from workers with less schooling.
6 Stiglitzs argument rests on the assumption that the abilities that correlate with schooling improve
productivity on some specialized vacancies but not on all jobs.
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trading process and derive the possible signalling proÞles. After that, the results will be
compared with the competitive equilibrium benchmark, the Riley outcome. Section 3
provides the steady state analysis and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of inÞnitely lived and risk neutral workers and
by a continuum of impersonal Þrms. Firms open vacancies that require a labor input of
exactly one worker.
2.1 Heterogeneous labor
Workers are heterogeneous and the type of a worker is denoted by θ ∈ Θ. This parameter
serves as a measure for labor productivity so that a worker with higher θ can produce more
output than a colleague with lower θ.
* Assumption 1 : The type of a worker θ is distributed on Θ = [θl, θh] according to
a strictly increasing function F (θ). F (θ) is common knowledge, while the actual
realization of θ is each workers private information.
2.2 Schooling
Before entering labor market, workers may devote eﬀort in acquiring some level of schooling,
s ∈ S = [0,∞)7 , in educational sector. For simplicity, it is assumed that schooling is a one
shot investment, the cost of which, C (θ; s) depends on the chosen educational level, s, and
on the type of the agent, θ.
* Assumption 2 :
Cs > 0, Cθ < 0, and Csθ < 0, Css > 0.
where the lower indices denote partial derivatives. C (θ; s) is common knowledge.
Assumption 2 is the Þrst necessary precondition for the existence of a separating
equilibrium, where educational level fully reveals the innate productivity of each worker.
After obtaining diploma from the educational sector, workers are ready to enter the
labor market and start searching for a job as an unemployed worker. Each worker type
7Hence, there is no upper bound for how much a single worker can choose to take education. Having an
upper bound for schooling would only limit the set of feasible separating equilibria; for a detailed discussion,
see Riley (1979).
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decides upon educational level by maximizing the net of the expected return from education
and the schooling cost:
s ∈ argmax
s∈S
Ui (θi; s,w (s)) = J
U
i (θi;w (s))−Ci (θi; s) ,
where JUi represents the family of utility functions describing the discounted value of being
unemployed with innate characteristics θi and with educational level s. Note that separating
equilibrium requires that the available wage rate in the labor market must be conditional
upon the observable level of schooling; i.e. w = w(s).
2.3 Search
We utilize a simple continuous-time search model where an unemployed worker locates a Þrm
with an open vacancy at a Poisson arrival rate α and a Þrm locates an unemployed worker
at rate β. Search eﬀort is assumed to be costless but time consuming. Each economic agent
discounts future income with the common discount rate, r > 0. Individual agents treat the
ßow probabilities as exogenously given, even though α and β, as well as the equilibrium
measures for unemployed workers and open vacancies, will be endogenously determined in
a steady state general equilibrium in Section 3.
2.4 Utilities from trading
We follow here Laing, Palivos andWang (1995) by assuming that once an unemployed worker
and an unÞlled job have been matched, the worker earns a perpetual8 ßow of income, the
discounted value of which reads as
∞Z
t
e−(τ−t)rw (s) dτ =W (s) .
Henceforth,W (s) is called as the wage function prevailing in the labor market, even though
it literally denotes the present value of the life-time earnings received by a worker labelled
with an educational level s.
Assuming that working eﬀort does not cause any disutility, risk-neutrality implies that
the discounted value of being employed is given by
JE (θ; s) =W (s) . (1)
Since an unemployed worker locates a potential employer at rate α, the value of being
unemployed obtains
rJU (θ; s) = α
¡
JE (θ; s)− JU (θ; s)¢ , (2)
8Thus, there is no exogenous job destruction and thereby no risk of falling back into the pool of
unemployed workers.
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Hence, each successful match in the labor market is followed by a perpetual stream of
output which is determined by workers type, θ, and his educational level, s. The present
value of this inÞnite ßow of output is denoted by V (θ; s) .
* Assumption 3 :
Vθ > 0, Vs > 0 and Vss < 0.
Assumption 3 simply states that both the workers innate type and education con-
tribute to the productivity of labor. However, schooling aﬀects V at a diminishing rate.
Regarding employers payoﬀs, the value available from a Þlled vacancy is
πF (θ; s) = V (θ; s)− JE (θ; s) . (3)
Moreover, given that Þrms locate workers at rate β, the expected present value of having
an unÞlled vacancy is given by
rE
£
πU (θ; s)
¤
= β
¡
E
£
πF (θ; s)
¤− E £πU (θ; s)¤¢ , (4)
where
E
£
πj (θ; s)
¤
=
Z
Θ
πj (θ; s) dF (θ) , j = U,F.
2.5 Bargaining9
Upon meeting, worker and Þrm negotiate over the division of the surplus generated by
the match. The bargaining process is modelled as a strategic bargaining game where the
unemployed worker is allowed to propose a wage demand in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion with
probability γ while the employer is in a similar position with the complementary probability
1 − γ.10 Generally, the dominant strategy in the bargaining game is to demand or oﬀer a
wage that makes the trading partner indiﬀerent between accepting the oﬀer or continuing
search. Hence, the party who receives the wage oﬀer is driven to his reservation utility level.
When the unemployed worker is to propose the oﬀer, the resulting wage demand captures
the net of the social gain from the match, V (θ; s) , and employers expected reservation
utility, E
£
πU (θ; s)
¤
. On the other hand, when the employer makes the oﬀer, he oﬀers a
9As already noted above, focusing on separating regimes guarantees that the bargaining with educational
signals can be treated as if there were no asymmetric information concerning workers innate abilities Under
separating regime, the observable educational level of a worker fully reveals the unobservable productivity
of the particular worker.
10This type of strategic bargaining produces a sharing rule that coincides with the outcome from gener-
alized Nash bargaining.
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future income stream equivalent to the value of being unemployed, JU (θ; s). Therefore, the
bargaining wage is the weighted average of these two oﬀers:
W (s) = γ
¡
V (θ; s)− E £πU (θ; s)¤¢+ (1− γ)JU (θ; s) . (5)
2.6 Separating equilibrium
DeÞnition 1 Separating equilibrium is a wage-function W (s) s.t. (i) workers of type θ
choose
s = g−1 (θ) ,
where
g−1 (θ) ∈ argmax
s∈S
U (θ, s,W (s)) =
©
JU (θ,W (s))−C (θ, s)ª ∀θ,
and (ii) ∃ [s
¯
,∞] ⊂ S s.t. g : [s
¯
,∞]→ R+is strictly and monotonically increasing with
θl ≥ g (s¯) ,
and (iii) W (s) results from the sharing rule expressed in (5) .
The condition (i) in DeÞnition 1 requires that the educational signals result from
workers optimization problem at the ex ante stage, given the prevailing wage function in
the labor market. the condition (ii), in turn, requires that for each educational level there is
exactly one worker type who have chosen that particular signal. Moreover, the condition (ii)
presumes that employers can infer higher schooling eﬀort to indicate higher ability. Finally,
the condition (iii) states that, given workers optimal signalling strategies, the equilibrium
wage schedule results from the sharing rule expressed in equation (5).
The equilibrium wage function supporting separating regime will be derived in the
spirit of backward induction: We start with the condition (iii) and determine wages as a
function of the educational signals. Then, given the wage function, we proceed with the
condition (i) and derive workers optimal schooling eﬀort at the ex ante stage. As a Þnal
step, we need to make sure that the possible signalling proÞles are consistent with the
condition (ii).
Given that workers have chosen the educational levels according to the separating
regime, plugging (2) and (4) into the sharing-rule in (5) , and utilizing (1) and (3), we have
W (s) =
γ (α+ r)
γα+ r
¡
V (h (s) , s)− E £πU (h (s) ; s)¤¢ , (6)
where h (s) = θ.
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Now, consider a schooling level s+∆. Then the corresponding wage satisÞes11
W (s+∆) =
γ (α+ r)
γα+ r
¡
V (h (s+∆) , s+∆)− E £πU (h (s) ; s)¤¢ . (7)
Subtracting (6) from (7), rearranging terms and dividing both sides by∆ gives the diﬀerence
quotient:
W (s+∆)−W (s) = γ (α+ r)
γα+ r
[V (h (s+∆) , s+∆)− V (h(s), s)] .
Now, letting ∆→ 0, we have the Þrst derivative of the wage function w.r.t. schooling:
W 0 (s) =
γ (α+ r)
γα+ r
[Vθh
0 (s) + Vs] , (8)
where the lower indices again denote partial derivatives.
According to the condition (ii) in DeÞnition 1, we must have h0 (s) > 0, which means
that the innate type of a worker, θ, and his educational choice, s, are positively related12.
Moreover, it should be clear by Assumption 2 that in a separating equilibrium the wages
must be increasing in schooling; i.e. W 0 (s) > 0.
Workers optimal signalling proÞle is determined by the following program for each
type θ ∈ Θ:
max
s
JU (θ,W (s))−C (θ, s) ,
and the Þrst-order necessary condition gives
α
α+ r
W 0 (s)−Cs = 0.
Utilizing (8) , the Þrst order condition becomes
γα
γα+ r
[Vθh
0 (s) + Vs]−Cs = 0, (9)
which can be solved for h0 (s) to yield
h0 (s) =
γα+r
γα Cs − Vs
Vθ
, (10)
Equation (10) is an ordinary diﬀerential equation. As noted by Riley (1979), this kind
of ODE has family of solutions of type
θ = h (s) = g (s;α, γ, k) , (11)
11Note that ∆ does not appear at E
£
πU (., .)
¤
, because the employers outside option is the same upon
every match.
12 If h0 (s) < 0, it would mean that more able workers would choose lower educational levels than the
less able colleagues. But in that case, due Assumption 1, it would always pay for the low-type workers to
imitate the high-types. Therefore, a signalling proÞle that is decreasing along with workers type cannot
establish a stable separating equilibrium.
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θ
θh
θl
s
g(s,α,γ,k)
s
g(s,α,γ,k)
Figure 1: One possible separating equilibrium
where k is an integrating constant. From (11), one can solve the equilibrium signalling as a
function of workers type:
s = g−1 (θ;α, k) . (12)
Clearly, the necessary precondition for a separating equilibrium h0 (s) > 0 is not
automatically satisÞed in (10). However, by convexity of C and concavity of V w.r.t. s,
we know that the numerator of (10) inevitably turns positive after some threshold s
¯
. It is
then a matter of choosing k such that θl ≥ g (s¯; ·) (required by cond. (ii)). Reminiscent of
the discussion by Riley (1979), g (s;α, γ, k00) in Figure 1 establishes a separating equilibrium
while g (s;α, γ, k0) does not.
Finally, it is instructive to derive the equilibrium wage function, given the equilibrium
signalling. Plugging (10) back into (8) , and using (11) and (12) , we get
Ws(g
−1 (θ)) =
α+ r
α
Cs(θ, g
−1 (θ)),
so that the equilibrium wage schedule yields
W (g−1 (θ)) =
α+ r
α
C(θ, g−1 (θ)) +K, (13)
where constant K can be interpreted as a base salary to be paid for each worker, regardless
of his type. According to (13), the equilibrium wage function is such that, at the time of
investment in schooling, the present value of the marginal increase in wages in response
to a marginal increase in educational level just oﬀ-sets the marginal costs from additional
schooling eﬀort. Interestingly, the parameter representing the relative strength of the worker
at the wage negotiation, γ, is absent in (13); i.e. no-excess-returns-from-schooling holds
regardless of γ.
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θ
θh
θl
s
g*(s,k*)
s
FB
Overinvestment
Figure 2: The Riley outcome
2.7 Riley outcome as a limiting case
Riley (1979) considered signalling in a competitive equilibrium model13, which can be seen
as a limiting case of the current setting. Assume that matching in the labor market is
highly eﬃcient so that workers locate employers very easily; i.e. α approaches inÞnity.
Then, equation (10) obtains
h0 (s) =
Cs − Vs
Vθ
,
which is equivalent to the formula derived by Riley (1979). In Rileys case, social optimum
would require that each type θ chose an educational level where the marginal cost and
marginal beneÞt from schooling balance; i.e. Cs = Vs. However, in a second-best solution,
separating equilibrium requires Cs > Vs. Thus, signalling proÞles that establish separating
equilibrium must entail too much investment in education compared to the socially eﬃcient
level.
According to so called Riley outcome (Figure 2), Pareto-dominant signalling proÞle
is the one where the least able worker (θl) chooses his Þrst-best education level while the
more able workers acquire education in a manner which is just enough to separate them
from the less able colleagues.
2.8 Signalling under search frictions
Under non-trivial search frictions, socially optimal educational level (Þrst-best) satisÞes
sfb = argmax
s
½
α
α+ r
V (θ, s)−C (θ, s)
¾
,
13Though, he needed to introduce a reÞnement to conventional Walrasian equilibrium concept in order to
obtain stability of the separating equilibrium. Rileys reÞnement was reactive equilibrium.
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and the Þrst-order condition of the Þrst-best can be written as
α+ r
α
Cs = Vs. (14)
However, under asymmetric information, separating equilibrium requires that
γα+ r
γα
Cs > Vs.
Obviously, if γ = 1, our model still coincides with the Riley outcome. However, when
γ < 1, the numerator of (10) turns positive already earlier than at the point where the
least able worker invests his Þrst-best level. In other words, it is possible to have signalling
proÞles that entail underinvestment and still support separating equilibrium.
More speciÞcally,
Lemma 1
∂g−1(θ;α, γ)
∂α
> 0,
∂2g−1(θ;α, γ)
∂α2
< 0 and
∂g−1(θ;α, γ)
∂γ
> 0,
∂2g−1(θ;α, γ)
∂γ2
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
According to Lemma 1, for any type θ, the level of education obtained is an increasing
but concave function of both the ease with which unemployed workers will locate vacant
jobs (α) and workers relative bargaining power (γ). Note that when either γ or α is
large enough, the slope of the signalling proÞle is ßatter than the slope of the Þrst-best
education proÞle. Thus, the overinvestment result is still likely to hold for the most able
types. On the other hand, if either γ or α approaches zero, the slope of the signalling proÞle
approaches vertical line leading to inÞnitesimal separation in educational levels. In that
case, the signalling proÞle capturing the minimum investment in schooling would lead to
underinvestment throughout the set Θ. Obviously,
Proposition 1 If either workers bargaining power is suﬃciently weak or the search fric-
tions on workers side of the market are severe, the minimum signaling proÞle is not Pareto-
dominant.
Instead, Pareto-dominant signalling proÞle is the one where the ineﬃciencies due
under- and overinvestment are minimized. Figure 3 illustrates the trade-oﬀ. If either γ
or α is relatively large, the minimum signaling proÞle is still likely to be Pareto-dominant -
underinvestment among the low-types reduces the ineﬃciencies caused by overinvestment
among the high-types. However, if either γ or α is suﬃciently low, the minimum signaling
10
θ
θh
θl
s
g*(s,k*)
s
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Overinvestment
Underinvestment
θ
θh
θl
s
g*(s,k*)
s
FB
Overinvestment
Underinvestment
high γ or α low γ or α
Figure 3: Pareto-dominant signalling proÞles
proÞle may be suboptimal; the Pareto-dominant signaling proÞle entails some overinvest-
ment among the least able workers in order to reduce underinvestment among the most able
workers.
It remains undecided, however, according to which signalling proÞle the workers will
school themselves. Even thought the minimum signalling proÞle is not necessarily Pareto-
dominant, it still seems the most plausible candidate. Since there are no extra returns
available from schooling, it seems unlikely that workers would choose any higher education
than the minimum level that is just enough to separate them from the less able workers.
Therefore, the minimum signalling proÞle is implicitly assumed throughout the next sec-
tion.
3 General equilibrium analysis
The analysis presented in this section follows rather closely Laing et al. (1995), who inves-
tigate the eﬀects of human capital accumulation on market entry and growth. Our main
results are seemingly similar to theirs, even though our model draws from the signalling
hypothesis. The economic interpretations are somewhat diﬀerent, however.
3.1 Entry and exit
It is assumed that new workers are born at an exogenously given and constant rate, η. From
employers side, however, we assume unrestricted entry. The cost of opening an vacancy is
denoted by φ, which can be thought to capture all the other factors of production except the
worker. Firms will open new vacancies until the expected proÞt from a Þlled vacancy equals
the Þxed cost, φ. After a successful match, both the hired worker and the Þlled vacancy
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exit the market forever.
3.2 Pairwise matching
The number of unemployed workers is denoted by u while v is our measure for the number
of open vacancies. The matching function, m0M (u, v), gives the total number of matches
at each point of time as a function of two inputs, u and v. Parameter m0 describes the
exogenous matching technology.
* Assumption 4: Matching function M : R2+ → R+ is strictly increasing and strictly
concave, satisÞes the Inada-conditions, and exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS).
In a steady state, pairwise matching requires:
αu = βv. (15)
3.3 Steady state equilibrium
DeÞnition 2 A steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a wage scheduleW (h(s), s,α∗, γ)
and a corresponding signalling proÞle g (s;α∗, γ, k), and a quadruple (α∗,β∗, u∗, v∗) s.t.
(i) E
£
πU
¤
= φ (free entry)
(ii) α∗u∗ = β∗v∗ = m0M (u∗, v∗) , (matching condition)
(iii) α∗u∗ = η (steady-state condition).
The pairwise matching condition, together with the CRS-property of the matching
function, implies that
β = m0M
µ
β
α
, 1
¶
, (16)
which implicitly deÞnes the locus of the Beveridge-curve (the steady state relationship be-
tween unÞlled jobs and unemployment) in αβ-plane. Utilizing the equilibrium wage schedule
given in (13), the free-entry condition can be written as
E
£
πU
¤
=
β
β + r
Z
Θ
£
V
¡
θ, g−1 (θ,α)
¢−W ¡g−1 (θ,α)¢¤dF (θ) = φ. (17)
Now, the equations (16) and (17) determine the steady state meeting rates, α∗ and
β∗. Since u∗ = η/α∗ and v∗ = η/β∗, the two equations solve the system completely, and
a steady state equilibrium can be found at the intersection of the Beveridge-curve (BC),
and the free-entry curve (FE).
Following immediately from Assumption 4, the locus of the Beveridge-curve is downward-
sloping and convex in αβ-plane. In turn, the slope of the free-entry curve obtains
12
dβ
dα
= −
R
Θ
[Vs −Ws] ∂g
−1
∂α dF (θ)
r/ (β + r)2
. (18)
Lemma 2 If γ → 1, the signalling proÞle approaches the Riley outcome and the free-entry
locus is monotonously upward-sloping in αβ-plane.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
Lemma 3 If γ << 1, the FE-locus may exhibit decreasing segments in αβ-plane.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
By the analysis carried out in the previous section, we know that if γ << 1, under-
investment in education arises, especially if α is relatively low. Therefore, it may not pay
to open new vacancies unless workers have suﬃcient incentives to invest in schooling, which
- by Lemma 1 - happens when the ßow probability α rises. Hence, in some cases higher
α may stimulate market entry by Þrms leading to tougher competition on labor force and
higher search frictions on employers side (lower β).14
As α → ∞, the signalling proÞle approaches the Riley outcome and the free-entry
locus becomes monotonously increasing. Therefore, we may conclude that the free-entry
locus necessarily turns increasing after some threshold level for α, say αh. Moreover, if
α→ 0 so that Ws →∞, we also know that the free-entry locus must be upward-sloping for
suﬃciently low levels of α, say α < αl. As depicted in Figure 4, if αl < αh, the free-entry
locus has a decreasing segment within the interval [αl,αh].
When α > αh, the separating regime generally entails overinvestment in schooling.
Thus, additional schooling eﬀort along with increasing α does not increase productivity as
much as it increases wage-costs, which discourages market entry by Þrms until the search
frictions faced by employers are suﬃciently low (i.e. β is high enough). On the other hand,
when α < αl, workers tend to underinvest in education. Even though this problem is reduced
along with higher α, lowering search frictions may not alleviate underinvestment enough in
order to boost market entry. That happens only when α ∈ [αl,αh].
3.4 Multiple equilibria
For multiple equilibria to arise, the downward-sloping property of the free-entry locus is
a necessary15 precondition. Moreover, the downward-sloping part of the free-entry locus
14This is essentially the same intuition as in the model by Laing et al.s (1995), where homogenous workers
optimize their schooling eﬀort at the ex ante stage. However, Laing et al. (1995) do not justify the shape
of the free-entry locus analytically.
15But not suﬃcient, as clearly visible in Figure 5.
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Figure 4: A unique steady-state equilibrium
needs to be steeper than the Beveridge-curve when the two locuses intersect (point E2 in
Figure 5).
Proposition 2 The labor market is the more likely to exhibit multiple equilibria the stronger
is the complementarity between workers type, θ, and education, s, and the weaker is workers
position at the wage-bargaining stage; i.e. the lower is γ.
Proof. See Appendix A4.
The result presented in Proposition 2 should not be very surprising. The stronger
is the complementarity between workers type and educational level the more severe is
the underinvestment problem. Therefore, a small reduction in search frictions (a slight
increase in α) may drastically reduce underinvestment and have a large positive impact on
productivity and market entry. Workers relatively weak position in wage negotiations (low
γ) ampliÞes this eﬀect. Figure 5 depicts an example where the multiplicity of equilibria
occurs.
Since the steady state unemployment is u∗ = η/α∗, E1 in Figure 5 is characterized
by high equilibrium unemployment and low market entry by Þrms. Under E3, in turn, the
labor market is ßooded by open vacancies, while the pool of unemployed workers is relatively
small. E2 is the intermediate equilibrium located at the intersection of the downward-sloping
free-entry locus and the Beveridge-curve.
The general pattern for the free-entry locus derived here is close to the pattern sug-
gested in Laing et al. (1995). Therefore, also the possibilities for escaping multiple equilibria
for a unique and a more desirable steady state equilibrium arise from similar economic fun-
damentals as in their model. Let us specify V (θ, s) = AQ(θ, s), where A represents the
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Figure 6: Eﬀects of improved matching and a positive technological shock
general level of technological development in the economy, and Q(θ, s) characterizes the
way in which workers type, θ, and educational level, s, contribute to production. Figure 6
suggests that even small improvements in either market infrastructure, m0, or the level of
technological development, captured by parameter A, can potentially lead to a considerable
leap from initially inferior equilibrium to a unique and a more eﬃcient equilibrium. Such a
take-oﬀ happens if the labor market equilibrium suddenly jumps from E1 to E30 or E300 . As
noted by Laing et al., a possible take-oﬀ can be interpreted as an example of Murphys et.
al (1991) big push argument to economic development, in which improvements in economic
infrastructure may push the economy from cottage-production to industrialization.
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4 Concluding remarks
According to Riley (1979) and Spence (1981), signalling function of schooling tends to induce
overinvestment in education. However, in a model with decentralized trading and search,
we found that the conditions of the bilateral bargaining process crucially aﬀect workers
incentives to invest in education. If workers bargaining power is strictly less than one, search
frictions tend to induce underinvestment in education at least within a subset of types. The
Riley outcome emerges only as a limiting case. Moreover, the Pareto-dominant signalling
proÞle - the proÞle that minimizes ineﬃciencies caused by under- and overinvestment - is
not necessarily the minimum signalling proÞle.
On the market level, we found that underinvestment in schooling may hinder job
creation when labor market is slack. Even though workers increasing likelihood to be
matched generally weakens Þrms position in wage negotiations, it also alleviates underin-
vestment problem. Therefore, it is possible that higher contact rate on workers side actually
stimulates market entry by Þrms. This feature may also give rise to multiple steady state
equilibria.
Reminiscent of the model by Laing et al. (1995), possibility of a Big Push develop-
ment arises: a (potentially) small improvement in either labor markets matching eﬃciency
or exogenous technological level may help the economy to escape multiple equilibria for a
unique and a more eﬃcient steady state equilibrium.
5 Appendix
A1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. From (10) we know that hsα < 0. Since g (s; ·) =
R
hsds,
∂g(s; ·)
∂α
=
Z
hsαds < 0,
which in turn directly implies that ∂g−1(θ; ·)/∂α > 0.
Similarly, by (10), hsαα > 0, which implies
∂2g(s; ·)
∂α2
=
Z
hsααds > 0,
and ∂2g−1(θ; ·)/∂α2 < 0. Similar reasoning applies for elaborating the eﬀect of γ.
A2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For the free-entry -locus to be downward-sloping, it is obvious by (18) and Lemma
1 that the diﬀerence Vs −Ws must be positive. In Riley outcome, separating equilibrium
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requires
Cs > Vs.
But since in Riley outcome Cs =Ws, we must conclude that Vs −Ws < 0.
A3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Now, separating equilibrium requires that
γα+ r
γα
Cs > Vs.
On the other hand,
Ws =
α+ r
α
Cs.
Thus, we may conclude that
Ws >
γ (α+ r)
γα+ r
Vs,
which implies that
Vs −Ws < (1− γ) r
γα+ r
Vs.
Thus, when
0 ≤ Vs −Ws < (1− γ) r
γα+ r
Vs,
dβ/dα < 0 in (18) .
A4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let us restate here the formula for the slope of the FE-curve:
dβ
dα
= −
R
Θ
[Vs −Ws] ∂g
−1
∂α dF (θ)
r/ (β + r)2
.
Clearly, the complementarity between θ and smakes Vs increasing in θ whileWs is unaﬀected
by the complementarity. Hence, the expected value of the diﬀerence Vs −Ws grows along
with stronger complementarity.
Moreover, lower γ moderates Ws and increases ∂g−1/∂α (which is obvious by Lemma
1, since the eﬀect of γ and α on g−1 are identical). Both of these eﬀects work for steeper
FE-locus.
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